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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78 A-
3-102(3)(a). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Pursuant to an Order of this Court dated November 25, 2008, the Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari was granted as to the following issue: 
"Whether the majority of the panel of the court of appeals erred in its 
assessment of the availability of civil claims for unjust enrichment and 
breach of contract in the context of the motion to dismiss filed in this case." 
Standard of Review: When exercising its certiorari jurisdiction, the Utah Supreme 
Court "review[s] the decision of the court of appeals, not of the trial court." Carrier v. Pro-Tech 
Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1997). The Supreme Court "accord[s] no particular 
deference to the court of appeals' ruling; we review for legal correctness." Bear River Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Wall, 978 P.2d 460 (Utah 1999). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
The determinative statutory provisions involved in this case are as follows: 
1. Utah Code § 25-5-4(1), which states in pertinent part: 
(1) The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note 
or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be 
charged with the agreement: 
(a) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one 
year from the making of the agreement; 
2. Utah Code § 30-3-5(8)(a)(vii), which states in pertinent part: 
1 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
* * * 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in 
the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor 
spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
This case involves breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims brought by 
Respondent Gloria Ashby (hereafter "Wife"), against her former spouse, Petitioner 
Dallen Ashby (hereafter "Husband"). Wife initially raised those claims in the parties 
divorce action, but upon recommendation of the court commissioner and order of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, they were dismissed from the divorce proceedings. (R. 
46). 
Wife thereafter filed a separate civil Complaint in the district court alleging breach 
of contract and unjust enrichment, and seeking an unspecified amount of damages. (R. 1-
5). The Complaint alleged that despite the lack of a premarital agreement or formal 
written instrument, the parties agreed that Husband would seek a college education and 
then a medical degree while Wife partially supported the parties through her 
employment. (R. 1-5). The parties anticipated that Husband's future income would be 
sufficient such that Wife could thereafter focus on being a mother and homemaker. 
However, the marital relationship deteriorated to the point that Wife left Husband when 
Husband completed medical school and was starting his internship and residency which 
was anticipated to last another five (5) years post medical school. Id. In a nutshell, Wife 
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argues that Husband breached the agreement of the parties and was unjustly enriched to 
her detriment. Id. No children were born as issue of the marriage. 
Husband answered the Complaint and filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the 
breach of contract claim is barred by the statute of frauds and that both the breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment claims are barred by this Court's opinion in Martinez v. 
Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991), as well as by sound public policy. (R. 8-34). 
Response and reply memoranda were filed by each party respectively. (R. 35-58). The 
Honorable Steven L. Hansen issued a Memorandum Ruling finding in favor of the 
arguments propounded by Husband. (R. 61-65). 
Wife subsequently appealed the ruling to the Utah Court of Appeals. Following 
briefing and oral arguments, the Court of Appeals found that Wife's dismissal was 
improper. Ashby v. Ashby, 2008 UT App. 254. Specifically, as to the breach of contract 
issue, the Court of Appeals held that although Husband raised the statute of frauds as an 
affirmative defense, he did not "prove 'every element necessary to establish that 
[defense].'" Id. at f 10. Regarding the unjust enrichment claim, the Court of Appeals 
held that the district court improperly interpreted Martinez and stated that the marital 
property "theory barred by Martinez is not akin to the express contract or unjust 
enrichment claims asserted by" Wife in this case. Ashby v. Ashby, 2008 UT App. 254 at 
IT 1 4 . 
Husband respectfully requests this Court reverse the holding of the Court of 
Appeals and affirm the ruling of the Fourth District Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
i J 
The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court's ruling which denied 
Wife's "breach of contract" and "unjust enrichment" claims which arose out of the 
parties' marital relationship. Wife's essential claim is that by periodically discussing 
their future lives before or during the marriage, the parties entered into a contract as 
binding and palpable as that entered into by merchants or corporations. Wife argues that 
Husband was unjustly enriched by her joint marital efforts in providing income and 
maintaining the parties' residence while he attended college and eventually medical 
school. Seeking contractual and quasi-contractual remedies, Wife is attempting to 
receive financial awards not only through alimony in their divorce action, but also 
through damages and/or quantum meruit in this alternative civil action. 
Wife's breach of contract claim should be rejected because the agreement of the 
parties was intrinsic to the marital relationship, namely, identifying who would ultimately 
be the primary breadwinner and primary homemaker, and simply involved charting a 
course to meet those goals. The alleged "contract" did not contemplate or take into 
account the possibility of the breakdown of the marriage, and did not identify what could 
be considered breach of its terms. As such, any alleged contract between the parties fails 
not just because it lacks formalization, definiteness, or adequate provisions, but because it 
was never intended by the parties to be a formal, binding agreement, but rather an 
aspiration regarding their joint lives together. 
Wife's action for "unjust enrichment" is merely a re-characterization of the 
"equitable restitution" doctrine rejected nearly eighteen years ago in Martinez v. 
Martinez. Furthermore, subsequent to the Martinez decision, Utah Code § 30-3-5 was 
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amended by the Utah Legislature to address the precise issues complained of in Martinez, 
and to give a remedy within the context of a divorce action. Thus, the current law 
precludes the need and the propriety for spouses to file alternative civil actions in order to 
be compensated for their contributions during marriage while the other spouse receives 
an education, and presumably, more earning potential. 
The remedies which Wife seeks in this matter are poisonous to the health of 
marriage as an institution, would complicate already difficult divorces, and stifle judicial 
economy. Permitting spouses to obtain remuneration outside or in addition to the divorce 
action and "double-up" financial awards creates an incentive for litigation that is clearly 
against public policy. Moreover, the Ashby decision essentially creates the ability for 
divorcing spouses to hedge their bets by filing two separate lawsuits, thus complicating 
divorces and adding yet another matter on a judge's docket. For all of the above reasons, 
articulated more extensively below, this Court should reverse the Court of Appeals' 
ruling and uphold the district court's dismissal of Wife's alleged causes of action. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PRESERVING WIFE'S CIVIL 
CLAIMS AGAINST HUSBAND FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT BECAUSE ABSENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
EXTRANEOUS TO THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP SUCH CLAIMS ARE 
IMPROPER AND RECEIVE ADEQUATE TREATMENT IN A DIVORCE 
ACTION 
This Court should hold that Wife's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted by improperly alleging causes of action for "breach of contract" 
and "unjust enrichment." Absent a showing that the relief sought is justified by 
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circumstances outside the context of the marital relationship and its attendant duties, 
spouses should not be permitted to file two separate civil actions. Rather, the domestic 
laws governing support, alimony, and property distribution are broad and flexible enough 
to protect a spouse who seeks equity and justice after a marriage fails despite his or her 
sacrifices during the marriage. 
Permitting spouses to file two separate actions upon the same common nucleus of 
facts will undoubtedly increase litigation following the breakdown of a marriage, 
complicate settlement and negotiation between spouses, and increase the burden on the 
court system as it is forced to essentially deal with the same issues twice. 
For reasons more fully articulated below, this Court should reverse the holding of 
the Court of Appeals and uphold the ruling of the trial court in dismissing Wife's 
Complaint. 
A. Wife's Breach Of Contract Claim Should Not Be Recognized As A Cause Of 
Action Stemming From The Dissolution Of The Marriage. 
Husband does not argue that spouses cannot or should not be able to enter into 
valid and binding contracts or agreements. There are some contracts legally prescribed 
for spouses such as premarital agreements, see U.C.A. § 30-8-3, post-marital agreements, 
seeD'Aston v. D Aston, 808 P.2d 111 (Utah App. 1990), or joint wills see U.C.A. § 75-2-
514. However, all have the common thread of requiring a written document attendant 
with all the formalities necessary to bind the parties and memorialize the terms and 
conditions of the agreement. 
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Most agreements between spouses relate to decisions that are intrinsic and 
commonplace to a marital relationship such as (1) deciding how many children to have, 
(2) whether one or both spouses will work, or (3) where to live. 
However, there are some agreements extrinsic to a marital relationship that 
spouses may enter together such as (1) a partnership or business relationship, (2) an 
employer-employee relationship between spouses, or (3) written financial arrangements 
between spouses where separate property is involved as collateral or for lending. 
The facts of this case are essentially present in every marriage. Spouses routinely 
discuss their individual and collective employment or educational aspirations and take 
steps to achieve those goals. The Court of Appeals identified such an agreement between 
Husband and Wife, but held that Wife could still pursue a civil action against Husband 
outside of the divorce proceeding—seemingly ignoring that the remedy Wife seeks is 
specifically provided for in U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(vii). 
In the present case, there was no writing alleged and Wife's claim is simply that 
Husband "requested that [she] work and support him during" his educational years. See 
Complaint, at Tf 8. Regardless, the alleged contract in this case would likely be 
unenforceable due to the mdefiniteness of the terms and conditions. See Sachs v. Lesser, 
163 P.3d 662, 668 (Utah App. 2007) ("[A] contract can be enforced . . . only if the 
obligations of the parties are set forth with sufficient defmiteness that it can be 
performed."). 
Numerous questions might be asked to point out the fact that the parties' alleged 
contract fails for lack of defmiteness: What if Husband chose to change careers? What if 
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he chose to work for a job that generated less income than expected? How long was 
Wife to work—only while Husband was in school, during his internship and/or residency, 
or until they had children? What was the level of income promised by Husband to ensure 
he met the standard of living contemplated by Wife? See Stangl v. Todd, 554 P.2d 1316, 
1319 (Utah 1976) ("[Wjhere a contract is so uncertain and indefinite that the intention of 
the parties in material particulars cannot be ascertained, the contract is void and 
unenforceable."). 
Interestingly, using Wife's understanding of the parties5 agreement, Wife 
apparently failed to perform on the "contract" by leaving the marriage before Husband 
finished school and filing for divorce, herself breaching the terms. This possibility 
illuminates the ludicrous and undesirable consequences that would undoubtedly follow as 
spouses attempt to construct an alleged contract out of their relationship and use the legal 
system to accuse the other of breaching in an effort to obtain damages. 
Utah case law has specifically dealt with claims brought by a divorcing party who 
seeks a financial award outside the context of alimony. In Martinez v. Martinez, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that a newly fashioned remedy called "equitable restitution" was 
unsustainable in the context of a divorce action. 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991). In that case, 
the Martinez's had been married for fifteen years, had three children, and put Mr. 
Martinez through medical school before filing for divorce. Id. at 539. At trial, Ms. 
Martinez was awarded child support, alimony, and other insurance benefits, but she 
appealed on grounds that the awards were inadequate in total. Id. 
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The Court of Appeals agreed with Ms. Martinez and adjusted the amounts of 
support and tax exemptions in favor of Ms. Martinez. Id. However, the Court of Appeals 
also believed that Ms. Martinez should be awarded further compensation for her 
contribution while Mr. Martinez attended medical school. Id. Bound by precedent that 
rejected treating advanced degrees as marital property, the Court of Appeals created a 
new type of property interest called "equitable restitution." Id. at 539-40. 
On review, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of equitable restitution 
for three main reasons: (1) the doctrine improperly treated marriage as a venture akin to a 
commercial partnership [the contract claim], id at 540-41, (2) an award of equitable 
restitution would be extremely speculative [the "indefiniteness" defense], id at 541, and 
(3) the concept of equitable restitution was indistinguishable from granting Ms. Martinez 
a property interest in her husband's medical degree [the unjust enrichment claim]. Id. 
Particularly relevant in the context of Wife's "breach of contract" claim is the 
Martinez court's first reason for disposing of the alternative relief sought—namely, that 
marriage and its dissolution should not be treated like a commercial partnership loaded 
with contracts and economic agreements. As argued more extensively below, Wife's 
breach of contract claim was properly dismissed not only because of the Martinez 
decision, but because of the undesirable consequences that would flow from granting a 
remedy that tends to debase and de-sanctify marriage as opposed to strengthening and 
supporting marriage. 
B. Wife's Unjust Enrichment Claim Is A Re-characterization Of The "Equitable 
Restitution" Issue Identified And Rejected In Martinez v. Martinez And Later 
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Addressed By The State Legislature In Amending Utah Code § 30-3-
5(8)(a)(vii). 
The district court properly held in its ruling below that the settled law in this area 
precludes a quasi-contractual remedy. The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Martinez, 
winch overturned the Court of Appeal's fashioning of a remedy called "equitable 
restitution," prevents a court from awarding a divorcing party financial support beyond 
the confines of alimony. 818 P.2d 538. 
Furthermore, only a few years following the Martinez decision, Utah Code § 30-3-
5 was amended to allow a party to address in a divorce action the precise concerns Wife 
raises in her Complaint. Thus, not only does Wife's argument fail under well-settled case 
law, there is also no need for her to have filed this alternative civil action to be made 
whole. 
L The Utah Supreme Court has rejected quasi-contractual remedies in the 
context of marriage. 
Because Wife has not pleaded the existence of a written contract, and especially 
under her claim for unjust enrichment, her arguments are essentially the type resolved in 
the Martinez case, and should be disposed of accordingly. 
As noted above, in Martinez the Utah Supreme Court rejected the "equitable 
restitution" remedy on three grounds: (1) the doctrine improperly treated marriage as a 
venture akin to a commercial partnership [the contract claim], 818 P.2d at 540-41, (2) an 
award of equitable restitution would be extremely speculative [the "indefiniteness" 
defense], id at 541, and (3) the concept of equitable restitution was indistinguishable from 
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granting Ms. Martinez a property interest in her husband's medical degree [the unjust 
enrichment claim]. Id. Ms. Martinez's claim that remedies available under Utah Code § 
30-3-5 were insufficient was also rejected by the court. Id. at 542. It is noteworthy that 
at the time Martinez was decided, that statute was not as favorable as it is currently for 
individuals in Ms. Martinez and Wife's circumstances, yet the majority found it adequate 
nonetheless. 
The ultimate conclusion of the Martinez court was that "if one spouse's earning 
capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the 
marriage, it may be appropriate for the trial court to make a compensating adjustment in 
dividing the marital property and awarding alimony," not through alternative civil 
remedies outside the divorce context. Id. Ms. Martinez candidly admitted, as has Wife 
herein, that the reason for seeking such a unique remedy was to obtain a "nonterminable 
interest, unlike alimony, which ordinarily terminates upon remarriage" or cohabitation 
and cannot exceed the length of the marriage except in extraordinary circumstances. Id. 
at 540; see also U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)(h), (9), (10). Despite the fact that Wife has alleged 
breach of contract in this case, a claim not raised in Martinez, without a premarital 
agreement or other formal contract she is essentially left to rely on the same claim in 
Martinez, namely, that she should be equitably compensated for her sacrifices and efforts 
during the term of the parties' marriage. 
The Martinez case stands to protect the exploitation and disintegration of the 
marriage relationship by preventing it from being viewed primarily as an economic joint 
venture. Notwithstanding that bar, Wife is not without remedy—Utah Code § 30-3-
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5(8)(a)(vii) requires a court to consider all of the circumstances pleaded by Wife and to 
award alimony accordingly. Wife, however, seeks an extraordinary remedy herein 
without precedent and without proper legal grounds. 
Other jurisdictions have dealt with similar questions. In Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 
P.2d 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983), a divorcing wife did not seek spousal support at trial. Id. 
at 199. Her claim of restitution for unjust enrichment was based purely upon the fact that 
she worked during the husband's first two years of law school, with his third year 
financed by savings that she largely contributed to. Id. Hence, the husband received a 
free education at the expense of the wife. The court was careful to distinguish that 
[w]here both spouses perform the usual and incidental activities of the 
marital relationship, upon dissolution there can be no restitution for 
performance of these activities. Where, however, the facts demonstrate an 
agreement between the spouses and an extraordinary or unilateral effort by 
one spouse which inures solely to the benefit of the other by the time of 
dissolution, the remedy of restitution is appropriate. 
Id. at 203. It is also noteworthy that the Pyeatte court rejected Mrs. Pyeatte's "breach of 
contract" claim due to the indefiniteness of terms without a writing. Id. at 200. 
InKuderv.Schroeder, 110N.C. App. 355,430 S.E.2d271 (N.C. App. 1993), wife 
asserted claims for divorce, child support, alimony, and raised additional claims for 
breach of contract and unjust enrichment. During the marriage, wife agreed to work and 
provide the income for the family while husband completed his undergraduate, Master, 
and law degrees. Id. at 356-57. Wife asserted that the agreement between the parties was 
that upon his employment after graduation she would devote herself full-time to being a 
wife and mother. Id. However, only three months after obtaining employment, husband 
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separated from wife. Id. Wife contended that the parties' agreement asserted in her 
complaint was valid and binding, affording her damages upon breach. Id. at 357. 
The trial court had dismissed the breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims 
on grounds that she had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. 
On appeal, the court sympathized with wife's condition, but stated that under North 
Carolina law there exists a "personal duty of each spouse to support the other, a duty 
arising from the marital relationship, and carrying with it the corollary right to support 
from the other spouse." Id. In other words, because unjust enrichment does not apply in 
circumstances where there is a pre-existing duty or obligation, wife could not seek later 
to be compensated for her efforts during the marriage. Id. at 364 (Wynn, J. concurring). 
In the present matter, while Wife contributed to the household expenses during the 
parties' marriage by working. Husband also contributed to the household expenses, 
although to a lesser degree, by working and through the acquisition of student loans. 
Husband is solely responsible for the repayment of all his student loans. Wife did not 
directly contribute to his direct educational costs such as tuition and fees. These were 
paid by Husband's student loans—for which he is solely responsible. There is no "free 
education" for Husband as there was in Pyeatte. Thus, Pyeatte does not provide enough 
persuasion for this Court to rule in clear contradiction to Martinez given the unique facts 
under which the wife in that case prevailed. 
Granting that Wife conferred some benefit to Husband by working while he 
attended school, the equitable manner to compensate her is by viewing her actions as 
providing income, domestic assistance, and other semces. The value of such services is 
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somewhat ascertainable, but would need to be offset by Husband's corollary duties and 
use of student loans which provided for the benefit of Wife, otherwise the unjust 
enrichment would flow the other direction. 
2. Utah Code § 30-3-5(8)(a)(vii) specifically provides the relief sought for by 
Wife within a divorce case, thus precluding the need to seek alternative 
civil remedies. 
Justice Durham's dissenting opinion in Martinez recognized the unsettling reality 
that at that time of the Martinez case there was no remedy for a spouse who had been 
"'investing' time, labor, earnings, and postponed improvements in standard of living for 
the long-term benefit of the marital community . . . before the investment has 'paid off" 
Martinez, 818 P.2d at 544. 
In Justice Durham's dissenting opinion in the Martinez case, she called for "a new 
and more flexible theory of alimony" which was answered a few years later when the 
Utah Legislature addressed this is sue and changed the alimony statute and Utah Code § 
30-3-5(8)(a)(vii) was enacted to specifically provide relief in the context of alimony for 
spouses similarly situated to Ms. Martinez and Wife herein. 
Specifically, the statute currently requires a court to consider "whether the 
recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying 
for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school 
during the marriage." U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(vii). The intent and benefit of this statutory 
requirement appears to be two-fold: first, the spouse who contributed to the other's 
education or earning potential is given the opportunity to receive an increased support 
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award, be it temporary, rehabilitative, or permanent alimony, in order to recoup any lost 
opportunities the spouse may have sacrificed for the benefit of the marital community; 
second, the statute permits an alimony award to take into account the contributions of the 
spouse and to provide a type of "compensation" that is not punitive or speculative in 
nature, yet gives an equitable award that is just for both parties. 
Wife claims that through her joints efforts in the marriage she conferred a 
substantial benefit on Husband while earning his degrees. Although Wife does not state 
it outright, her claim is essentially that her contributions to Husband while he attended his 
schooling gives her an interest in his degrees (or income derived therefrom), and should 
be considered marital property subject to division. 
Utah courts have clearly ruled that "an advanced degree is or confers an intangible 
right which, because of its character, cannot be properly characterized as property subject 
to division between the spouses." Peterson v. Peterson, iyi P.2d 237, 241 (Utah App. 
1987); see also Martinez, 818 P.2d at 541. In Peterson, upon divorce after twenty years 
of marriage the wife, who had supported her husband during his medical training both 
financially and otherwise, was awarded a $120,000 lump sum property award, in addition 
to permanent alimony, as her portion of the interest in husband's medical degree. 737 
P.2d at 238. The appeals court agreed with the husband that the award of "his" medical 
degree was impermissible because such could not be properly characterized as marital 
property. 
Particularly relevant to the case at bar, the Peterson court stated that when 
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divorce occurs shortly after the degree is obtained, traditional alimony 
analysis would often work a hardship [on the spouse who supported the 
other]. . . . Nonetheless, such a spouse is typically not remote in time from 
his or her previous education and is otherwise better able to adjust and to 
acquire comparable skills, given the opportunity and funding. In such 
cases, alimony analysis must become more creative to achieve fairness, and 
an award of 'rehabilitative' or 'reimbursement' alimony, not terminable 
upon remarriage, may be appropriate. 
Id. at 242 n.4. It should be noted that four years later, the Martinez decision further 
solidified the impropriety of seeking financial support upon divorce outside of the 
alimony context. See section B1 above for greater treatment of Martinez. 
In Sorenson v. Sorenson, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court 
recounted the case history against treating personal degrees as marital property and 
accordingly rejected the wife's argument that the goodwill and reputation of the 
husband's dental practice was a marital asset subject to division. In particular, the court 
stated that "[rjequiring plaintiff to divide with his wife the value of his reputation would 
not be an 'equitable division,' which is required by our statue, but would constitute 
'double counting,' which is condemned in property division cases." Id at 776. The court 
astutely noted that "the similarities [between a degreeholder and a shareholder] compel 
analogous treatment in a divorce setting . . . [that] the 'asset' involved is not salable and 
had a computable value to the individual only to the extent that it promises increased 
future earnings." Id. at 777 (quoting Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W. 2d 343, 354-55 
(Wis.Ct.App. 1981)). 
The common thread of reason that permeates this area of divorce is that a party's 
advanced degree or speculative earning potential is not marital property subject to 
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division. Alternative civil proceedings that would allow a ''double reward" to a spouse 
are clearly inequitable and improper given the availability for a spouse to seek "financial 
justice" through Utah Code § 30-3-5(8)(a)(vii). 
In the present case, the parties both currently make approximately the same level 
of income and will continue to do so until Husband finishes his residency requirements in 
approximately two years. The parties had no minor children together and are still young, 
both in their early thirties. Wife's major argument is that because the parties were 
married a little over eight years, her alimony award is inequitably limited to the short 
duration of the marriage and to Husband's current financial status which mirrors her own, 
and is expected to be so for another four to five years. However, a district court may 
properly take all these considerations into account, including the fact that Wife assisted 
Husband while earning his degrees, and can determine an equitable alimony award that 
may seek to rehabilitate her own educational opportunities, grant a lump-sum payment, or 
provide for payments that increase over time, etc. In other words, Wife can be made 
whole through the divorce action. An alternative award of damages or restitution is 
speculative at best and permits the "punishment" of a spouse. 
Thus, the Court of Appeal's holding should be reversed because Wife's cause of 
action for "unjust enrichment" is not recognized, and should not be recognized, under the 
Utah law, and impermissibly strays from the divorce context that can provide full equity 
and justice. 
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C. Utah's Strong Public Policy To Protect The Institution Of Marriage And 
Preserve Judicial Economy Would Be Strengthened By Reversing The Court 
Of Appeals Holding. 
The foregoing analysis and discussion contained herein exemplifies the type of 
degradation marriage will be subject to should this Court permit Wife's claims to proceed 
to trial. Marriage is a union that is unlike other commercial partnerships or ventures. 
The closeness and unity of purpose along with mutual and voluntary sacrifices and 
contributions performed in a marriage cannot be adequately contained, protected, or 
described by contract law principles. Though married parties are permitted to enter into 
valid contracts before, during, and after marriage, such must be done in writing with 
definiteness. Such must be done and in writing to pull the "ordinary and routine" 
promises up to the commercial contract level. Otherwise, all "pillow talk" between 
spouses should remain protected from the threat, indeed the fear, of future litigation 
consequences, and to avoid the possibility that a spouse may find himself or herself in a 
legal proceeding where such intimate matters are changing into legal, binding contracts 
with liability and damages. This would stifle the parties' ability to talk to each other, 
dream, plan for the future, make decisions, adjust plans when necessary, and live out their 
lives according to what is in the best interest of the marital and family unit free of the 
ever looming threat of civil liability and potential damages. 
If this Court recognizes the claims sought by Wife, marriage can be viewed legally 
as primarily an commercial economic venture. Parties will be forced to carefully detail 
their actions and obligations so as to avoid liability, thus removing any incentive to act in 
the best interest of the family unit. In some marriages, allowing such claims would 
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incentivize spouses to "cash in" by divorcing and filing for alternative civil remedies. 
For some, marriage would become less desirable due to the potential lifetime payment or 
lump sum judgments for "damages" or "restitution" that might follow. In short, marriage 
would suffer immensely. 
Doubtless, if Wife's claims receive merit, litigation will multiply as divorce cases 
are followed by the filing of separate and additional alternative civil law suits and claims. 
Such multiplicity of litigation will inject greater uncertainty, stress, and contention into 
divorce proceedings that are already taxing parties to their emotional and financial limits. 
The clear trend in domestic law over the recent years has been to attempt to keep parties 
out of the courthouse and to give parties resources to make resolution more successful. 
Settlement negotiations will be complicated and compromised by the alternate theories of 
recovery appropriated in Ashby. Further, divorce cases will become more complex and 
involve multiple court forums, thus preventing judicial economy. For these weighty 
reasons, Husband urges this Court to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals below. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner, Dallen Ashby, respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the Court of Appeal's ruling and hold that the civil claims raised by 
Respondent are unavailable when arising out of the context of a marital relationship, 
notwithstanding that relief may still be obtained through the parties' divorce action. 
Dated: J ^ * t « c ^ 2-C*flvc^ . 
Respectfully Submitted, 
David J. Hunter 
Counsel for Defendant and Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, no 
addendum is offered or necessary. 
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